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CHAMPIONS OF JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SITUATION 
IN GEORGIA 
By B. Aloka Wanigasuriya** 
ABSTRACT 
In August 2008, an armed conflict erupted between Georgia and Russia in the pro-Russian 
breakaway region of South Ossetia. An estimated 850 lives were lost, and more than 100,000 
civilians fled their homes during the conflict. On August 14, 2008, the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the commencement of a preliminary examination 
into the situation in Georgia. Progress was slow. However, on January 27, 2016, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I granted authorization to the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the situation. 
In Georgia, despite the presence of the necessary domestic legislative framework for prosecuting 
international crimes, national investigative and prosecutorial action pertaining to the alleged 
international crimes have come to a standstill. The initiation of the ICC’s preliminary 
examination and investigation was heralded by Georgian civil society, who had predominantly 
taken up the task of seeking redress on behalf of victims. This article outlines the background of 
the conflict, the ICC’s involvement in Georgia, the Georgian government actions and, most 
importantly, the role played by Georgian civil society in seeking justice for the alleged international 
crimes committed during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Finally, it sets out the present challenges 
and makes recommendations on how the ICC may better direct its efforts in Georgia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the role of civil society in the context of 
the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) preliminary examination 
and ongoing investigation into the situation in Georgia. The situation 
stems from the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, which took place between 
Georgia and the Russian Federation (Russia) and resulted in the alleged 
commission of international crimes. The ICC was quick to respond to 
the conflict, first initiating a preliminary examination into the situation 
and then an investigation. Its investigation into the situation is 
ongoing. The situation in Georgia and the ongoing ICC investigation 
are important to the entire international criminal justice project and the 
Court for several reasons. The Georgian situation is one of many firsts: 
the first instance where the ICC Prosecutor initiated an investigation 
into a situation arising outside of the African continent; the first 
instance of an investigation initiated into a situation in a post-Soviet 
country; and the first situation involving alleged crimes committed in 
the context of an international armed conflict.1 Domestically in 
Georgia, despite the presence of the necessary domestic legislative 
framework for prosecuting international crimes, national investigative 
and prosecutorial action pertaining to the alleged international crimes 
have come to a standstill. Hence, the initiation of the ICC’s preliminary 
 
 1 Dr. Iryna Marchuk & Aloka Wanigasuriya, Venturing East: The Involvement of 
the International Criminal Court in Post-Soviet Countries and its Impact on Domestic Processes, 
44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 735, 739 (2021). 
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examination and investigation was heralded by Georgian civil society 
who had predominantly taken up the task of seeking redress on behalf 
of victims of the Russia-Georgia war. Against this backdrop, Part I of 
this article sets out the background of the conflict and the ICC’s 
preliminary examination and investigation. Part II outlines steps taken 
by the Georgian authorities. Part III discusses the role played by civil 
society in seeking justice for the alleged international crimes committed 
during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. In conclusion, this article sets out 
the present challenges and makes recommendations on how the ICC 
may better direct its efforts in Georgia. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT AND THE ICC’S PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION AND INVESTIGATION 
The 2008 Russia-Georgia war has ties to historical factors 
spanning back many decades. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(USSR) in the 1990s, pro-Russian South Ossetia and Abkhazia were 
reluctant to accept Georgian rule.2 South Ossetia remained an 
autonomous region of Georgia until late 1990 when the Georgian 
government abolished its autonomy, which led to violent clashes 
between Ossetian and Georgian paramilitary forces.3 The fighting 
continued despite Soviet military intervention in April 1991.4 On April 
9, 1991, Georgia proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union.5 
South Ossetians, however, held a referendum on January 19, 1992, 
with a majority of voters choosing to break away from Georgia and be 
incorporated into Russia, eventually leading the South Ossetian 
parliament to declare independence on May 29, 1992.6 The claims of 
self-determination exacerbated the conflicts across South Ossetia and 
 
 2 Thomas D. Grant, Frozen Conflicts and International Law, 50 CORNELL INT’L 
L. J. 361, 383-90. (2017). 
 3 Закон Республики Грузия от 11.12.1990 No. 63-І «Об упразднении 
Юго-Осетинской автономной области [Law of the Republic of Georgia No. 63-
I on the Abolition of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia] (Dec. 11, 1990). 
 4 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL 
FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA: REPORT (VOL. II), at 71 
(Sept. 2009). 
 5 Id. at 151. 
 6 Grant, supra note 2, at 383. 
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Abkhazia, and raged on until a ceasefire brokered in 1994 subdued the 
fighting.7 
Following the ceasefire, the conflict remained frozen8 until 
2003, when former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili came to 
power following the ‘Rose Revolution’. His campaign promises 
included North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership 
for Georgia and restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.9 Five years later, in 2008, Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence from Serbia strengthened South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian aspirations for independence. Moreover, in early 2008, 
Russia initiated closer ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which 
further soured its relationship with Georgia.10 Tensions between 
Russia and Georgia reached an all-time high resulting in a five-day 
armed conflict in the pro-Russian breakaway region of South Ossetia 
in August 2008. An EU-mediated Six Point Agreement between 
Georgia and Russia put an end to hostilities.11 However, according to 
 
 7 On October 31, 1994, representatives from Georgia, Russia, South 
Ossetia, and North Ossetia signed an Agreement on Further Development of 
Georgian-Ossetian Peaceful Settlement Process and on Joint Control Commission. 
This came after Georgia and Russia signed the Agreement on Principles of 
Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict (“Sochi Agreement”) on June 24, 
1992. Id. at 384. 
 8 The lack of active hostilities for a period of many years despite the lack of 
peace led to the conflict being classified as being “frozen”. Erin Mooney, From 
Solidarity to Solutions: The Government Response to Internal Displacement in Georgia, in FROM 
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPONSE: ASSESSING NATIONAL APPROACHES TO INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT 179 (The Brookings Inst.-London Sch. of Econ., Project on Internal 
Displacement 2011). 
 9 FACTBOX: Facts about the 2008 war in Georgia, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2009, 6:14 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-war-conflict-sb/factbox-facts-
about-the-2008-war-in-georgia-idUSTRE5732TH20090804 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2020.); Marchuk & Wanigasuriya, supra note 1, at 738. 
 10 Grant, supra note 2, at 385. 
 11 Frozen conflicts in Georgia: is there a way out?, EUROPEAN PARLAIMENT: 
BRIEFING (June 7, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en
/agenda/briefing/2018-06-11/9/frozen-conflicts-in-georgia-is-there-a-way-out (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2020.). 
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an EU fact-finding report, an estimated 850 people were killed, and 
more than 100,000 civilians fled their homes during the conflict.12 
Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, allegations were made 
that international crimes had been committed during the conflict. The 
ICC’s subsequent reaction was swift. Its Prosecutor announced the 
commencement of a preliminary examination into the situation on 
August 14, 2008.13 However, its progress was slow. Seven years elapsed 
before the Prosecutor submitted her request for authorisation of an 
investigation into the situation in Georgia to Pre-Trial Chamber I on 
October 13, 2015.14 However, following this, it only took four months 
before authorisation to investigate alleged war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in and around South Ossetia between July 
1, 2008 and October 10, 2008 was granted by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
(“PTC”) on January 27, 2016.15 
The initiation of the ICC investigation was particularly 
heralded by members of civil society who had predominantly taken up 
the task of seeking redress for victims in Georgia. Civil society has long 
played an important role in terms of the ICC. Their role during the 
negotiation process for the Rome Statute, the ICC’s constitutive 
instrument, has been viewed as a significant illustration of civil 
society’s influence in the design of international institutions and the 
development of international law.16 Since the Court’s inception, civil 
 
 12 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL 
FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA: REPORT (VOL. I), at 5 
(Sept. 2009). 
 13 Georgia, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia (last visited March 22, 
2021.). 
 14 Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15, Request for Authorisation of 
an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_19375.PDF; Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC 
01/15, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant 
to article 15”, Oct. 16, 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_21221.PDF. 
 15 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for 
authorization of an investigation, ¶ 7, ¶ 26 (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_00608.pdf. 
 16 Sarah Williams, Civil Society Participation in Preliminary Examinations, in 2 
QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 553 (Morten Bergsmo & 
Carsten Stahn eds., 2018). 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
104 
society has continued to play a vital role in terms of the Court’s 
ongoing activities in situation countries. Civil society actors have 
facilitated the international criminal justice process by submitting 
communications regarding alleged international crimes to the ICC,17 
assisting victims in making submissions to the Court,18 taking part in 
ICC non-governmental organization (“NGO”) roundtable sessions in 
order to highlight concerns and avenues for improvement,19 and more. 
In Georgia, civil society has played an active role throughout the ICC’s 
preliminary examination process and the current ICC investigation. To 
date, civil society continues to monitor the activities of the Court and 
the Georgian government, highlighting the expectations of affected 
communities, outlining areas requiring further attention, and most 
importantly, spearheading calls for justice for the international crimes 
allegedly committed during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. 
II. GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
When the Russia-Georgia conflict erupted in 2008, Georgian 
domestic legislation was already well equipped to conduct domestic 
prosecutions for any international crimes committed during the 
conflict. Georgia had already signed the Rome Statute on July 18, 1998 
and deposited its instrument of ratification on September 5, 2003.20 
Subsequent to ratifying the Rome Statute, the country brought its 
 
 17 Meet our Members: Civil Society’s role in Georgia: Interview with Ms. Nino 
Tsagareshvili, COALITION FOR THE ICC (Oct. 22, 2019), http://
www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20191022/civil-societys-role-georgia-interview-
with-nino (last visited Jan. 5, 2020.). 
 18 Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15, Public With Public Annex A 
and Confidential Annex B. Report on the Victims’ Representations Received 
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 13 (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_23215.PDF; Int’l P’ship for Human Rights, 
Representations Submitted on Behalf of Victims of International Crimes in the Sitution in Georgia 
Persuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court, Case No: 
ICC-01/15 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.srji.org/upload/medialibrary/b51/icc-
georgia-submission-without-annexes.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2020.). 
 19 Annual Round Table Meeting Held between ICC and NGOs, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CENTER (June 21, 2017), http://humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=19257
&lang=eng (last visited Jan. 6, 2020.). 
 20 Georgia, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia (last visited March 22, 
2021.). 
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domestic laws, the Criminal Code of Georgia (CCG), in line with the 
Statute so as to allow any possible national prosecutions of 
international crimes. For instance, the amendments to the Criminal 
Code of Georgia provided for the “surrender and extradition of 
offenders” suspected of committing international crimes to the ICC 
for prosecution.21 Moreover, Section 14 of the CCG criminalizes a 
category of crimes named, “Crime against Humanity, Peace and 
Security and against International Humanitarian Law” (Articles 404-
413), which includes: the crime of aggression (Articles 404-405); 
genocide (Article 407); crimes against humanity (Article 408); and war 
crimes (Articles 411-413).22 However, following the Russia-Georgia 
conflict, it was yet to be seen if and how these laws would be utilized 
in practice in order to initiate domestic investigations and prosecutions 
for the alleged commission of international crimes. 
Initially, while it appeared as though the national authorities in 
both Georgia and Russia were conducting investigations into the 
alleged crimes committed during the Russia-Georgia war, by October 
2015, this only held true for Russia, who was investigating the alleged 
attacks against Russian peacekeepers.23 In Georgia, the national 
authorities initiated some investigative steps between August 2008 and 
November 2014.24 For instance, in its 2015 application to the PTC 
seeking authorization of an investigation, the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) noted that the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia had 
reportedly interviewed over 7,000 witnesses and taken a number of 
other domestic investigative steps including the conduction of on-site 
investigations in over thirty affected areas, forensic medical and 
property analyses, and more.25 However, attempts by international and 
domestic civil society organizations to obtain information regarding 
 
 21 Criminal Code of Georgia, Art. 6, LHG, 41(48) (1999). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of 
an investigation pursuant to article 15”, supra note 14, ¶¶ 41-42; Situation in Georgia, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, supra note 
15, ¶¶ 47-50. 
 24 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for 
authorization of an investigation, supra note 15, ¶ 41, ¶¶ 278-302. 
 25 Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of 
an investigation pursuant to article 15”, supra note 14, ¶ 288. 
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the progress of domestic investigations in Georgia were often 
unsuccessful. For instance, according to the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee, their letters to the Georgian Ministry of Justice seeking 
information regarding domestic investigations went unanswered.26 
Domestic civil society actors have similarly stated that it has been 
difficult to ascertain the progress and effectiveness of national 
investigations, and that the disclosure of information regarding such 
investigative activities by the Georgian authorities has been sparse.27  
According to the OTP, a lull in national proceedings was 
observed in Georgia from the end of 2012 to mid-2014. Eventually, in 
a letter dated March 17, 2015, the Georgian government informed the 
OTP that national proceedings into cases related to the displacement 
of ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia had been suspended 
indefinitely.28 Perhaps as further justification, in a statement made at 
the 16th Assembly of States Parties in 2017, the Georgian Deputy 
Minister for Justice, Mr. Gocha Lordkipanidze, stated that while his 
country had “carried out unprecedented [domestic] investigation[s] . . . 
despite continued efforts [their] ability to carry out additional necessary 
investigative measures in those territories . . . is hampered by the 
continued [Russian] occupation.”29 The March 17, 2015 letter to the 
OTP signalled to the Court that domestic prosecutions in Georgia had 
come to a standstill and had a significant impact on the 
complementarity assessment that was being carried out by the OTP. 
The OTP eventually assessed that the admissibility threshold for the 
initiation of an ICC investigation would be met “due to State inaction” 
 
 26 NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, UNABLE OR UNWILLING? 
GEORGIA’S FAULTY INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING AND AFTER 
THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF AUGUST 2008, at 15 (Feb. 2011). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for 
authorization of an investigation, supra note 15, ¶¶ 41-42. 
 29 Ministry of Justice of Georgia, Statement of the Deputy Minister of 
Justice of Georgia H.E. Mr. Gocha Lordkipanidze: General Debate of the 16th 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-
GEO.pdf. 
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in Georgia, thus paving the way for its request to the PTC seeking 
authorization for initiating an investigation into the situation.30 
As for the claims of having undertaken unprecedented national 
investigations in Georgia, a 2019 report released by a combination of 
Georgian civil society organizations, which included data covering the 
majority of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) communities spread 
across Georgia and consisted of victims of the alleged international 
crimes, revealed that ninety-four percent of respondents had never 
been contacted by domestic investigative authorities.31 An earlier 
report by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, based on interviews 
with victims of serious crimes allegedly committed during the conflict 
and conducted at several villages in the Gori and Kareli regions, found 
that Georgian police had neither investigated certain crimes nor carried 
out forensic examinations.32 According to this 2010 report, victims 
generally possessed limited faith in domestic investigations and 
doubted the chances of ever achieving accountability.33 
As for the ICC and its actions in Georgia, as further elucidated 
in the following sections of this article, the affected populations’ 
awareness of these interventions was also sparse. Amidst the lack of 
awareness found in victim populations regarding the ICC’s mandate, it 
is reported that some senior Georgian government officials visited 
IDP camps in order to educate victims about the Court.34 Despite its 
domestic investigative and prosecutorial activities having come to a 
standstill, Georgia has been receptive of the ICC and its activities. The 
country has been steadfast in confirming its commitment to the Court, 
 
 30 Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of 
an investigation pursuant to article 15,” supra note 14, ¶ 42, ¶¶ 279-303. 
 31 MARIAM ANTADZE ET. AL., 10 YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST WAR: VICTIMS 
OF THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA 34 ( 2019). 
 32 NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 17. 
 33 Id. at 17-18. 
 34 It is reported that, in May 2017, the Georgian deputy justice minister 
travelled personally to the Gori and Kareli IDP camps in order to educate victims 
regarding the Court. See Stephanie Maupas, Wake Up to Suffering of Georgian Victims, 
NGOs Tell International Court, JUSTICEINFO (Feb. 8, 2018) https://www.
justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/36377-wake-up-to-suffering-of-georgian-victims-
say-human-rights-groups.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). 
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repeatedly assuring the Court of its cooperation.35 While the 
preliminary examination process was ongoing, Georgia provided the 
OTP with twelve submissions, which included eight submissions on 
the status of relevant national proceedings.36 Moreover, following the 
initiation of the ICC investigation, high-level Georgian officials – 
including the Georgian prime minister at the time, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, 
and the Georgian minister of justice, Tea Tsulukiani – welcomed the 
Court’s decision, assuring the ICC of the Country’s active cooperation 
with the Court.37 In line with this commitment, the ICC’s Registrar 
visited Georgia in mid-2017 in order to sign a cooperation agreement 
with the Government of Georgia which would facilitate the Court’s 
ongoing investigative activities in the country.38 In recent years, further 
demonstrating Georgian cooperation with the Court, the Georgian 
government entered into an agreement with the ICC in January 2019, 
entitled “Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences,” that would 
facilitate those convicted by the Court, serving their sentences in 
Georgia.39 
Regardless of the above actions, due to the Georgian 
authorities’ inability to investigate and prosecute the alleged 
international crimes committed during the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
conflict, Georgian victims have been left in a precarious position. This 
has meant that victims must now rely on non-governmental actors (i.e., 
civil society) for assistance and guidance on external avenues through 
which to obtain justice. 
 
 35 Ministry of Justice of Georgia, supra note 29. 
 36 Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15-4-AnxJ-Corr, Corrected 
Version of Annex J to Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to 
Article 15, ¶¶ 2-5, ¶ 8 (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords
/CR2015_21302.PDF. 
 37 Coalition for the ICC, Georgia: A Test Case for the ICC’s Future, 
#GLOBALJUSTICE WEEKLY (Feb. 23, 2016), https://ciccglobaljustice.
wordpress.com/2016/02/23/georgia-a-test-case-for-the-iccs-future/ (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2020.). 
 38 ICC signs cooperation agreement with Government of Georgia, ICC (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1327 (last visited Jan. 6, 2020.). 
 39 ICC and Government of Georgia conclude Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences, 
ICC (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1432 (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2020.). 
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSE 
A. Documenting alleged crimes, providing assistance to victims, and 
advocating for the initiation of an ICC investigation 
In Georgia, from the outset, due to the lack of national 
prosecutions, much of the burden of seeking justice on behalf of 
victims of the conflict has been shouldered by civil society.40 Georgian 
civil society has worked tirelessly to document the alleged international 
crimes, advocate on behalf of victims, and to provide legal and other 
assistance to victims. The extent of the undertaking shouldered by civil 
society is due to several factors, including the reluctance of national 
authorities to share information with civil society and the public and 
political unwillingness to deal with the conflict-related crimes.41 
Following the aftermath of the war, several Georgian NGOs 
joined forces and were at the forefront of interviewing thousands of 
victims to document the alleged violations of international law 
committed during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. They travelled to 
villages located within the conflict zone and the “buffer zone” in order 
to communicate directly with victims and to collect evidence of the 
alleged crimes.42 They collected information both at IDP settlements, 
and later in villages, once Russian forces had left.43 The obtained 
evidence was compiled into the August Ruins report.44 This report was 
subsequently communicated to the ICC’s OTP in 2009 pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute with the view of assisting the OTP in 
its preliminary examination activities.45 The August Ruins report was 
the first step by Georgian civil society to document the alleged human 
rights violations and other international crimes committed during the 
August 2008 war. Subsequently, the international NGO the 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee also communicated four additional 
 
 40 Marchuk & Wanigasuriya, supra note 1, at 759. 
 41 Id. 
 42 GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION ET AL., AUGUST RUINS vii 
(Tinatin Khidasheli ed., 2008). 
 43 Id.. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Meet our members, COALITION FOR THE ICC, supra note 17. 
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reports to the ICC regarding the conduction of domestic investigations 
in both Georgia and Russia.46 
Seeking additional avenues through which to obtain justice for 
victims, Georgian civil society actors later utilized the collected 
material to assist victims when submitting applications to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).47 As a result, by 2011, the 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Article 42 of the Constitution 
(now known as Rights Georgia), and the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee were representing victims in over one hundred individual 
cases linked to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war at the ECtHR.48 However, 
despite the high number of individual applications lodged at the 
ECtHR, progress has been slow. Some civil society actors have voiced 
the opinion that the Russia-Georgia conflict is perhaps “too big and 
serious to be confronted at the local or even regional level”.49 Hence, 
for some victims who are fatigued by the long wait they experienced 
at the ECtHR, a high degree of hope with regard to obtaining justice 
now lies with the ICC. 
In terms of the information it has received regarding the 2008 
Russia-Georgia war, the ICC’s OTP has acknowledged the high quality 
of the submissions it has received from Georgian civil society.50 
However, in her request seeking the PTC’s authorization to initiate an 
investigation, the Prosecutor relied on an evidentiary base comprised 
of public source documents, previous non-judicial investigations, and 
 
 46 Heather Yundt, ICC Prosecutor Seeks Investigation of Russia-Georgia War, 
INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 3, 2015), https://iwpr.net/
global-voices/icc-prosecutor-seeks-investigation-russia (last visited Jan. 30, 2019.). 
 47 Id.; Giorgi Janelidze, Five Georgian NGOs Appealed to the Justices of the 
International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE FOUNDATION (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://humanrightshouse.org/articles/five-georgian-ngos-appealed-to-the-
justices-of-the-international-criminal-court/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2020.). 
 48 NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 16. 
 49 Coalition for the ICC, supra note 37; Nika Jeiranashvili, The Georgian 
Experience: A Story of How the ICC is Failing Victims in its First Case Outside Africa, INT’L 
JUST. MONITOR (May 10, 2018), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/05/the-georgian-
experience-a-story-of-how-the-icc-is-failing-victims-in-its-first-case-outside-africa/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2020.). 
 50 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESSURE POINT: THE ICC’S IMPACT ON 
NATIONAL JUSTICE 74 (2018). 
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media sources, thus excluding the reports submitted to it by these 
Georgian sources.51 As some international NGOs opine, the lack of 
communication between the Georgian government and civil society 
placed the latter in a disadvantageous position.52 According to these 
commentators, the inability of Georgian civil society to furnish the 
OTP with information regarding domestic investigative activities has 
weakened its position with the Court.53 
Regardless, Georgian civil society organizations continuously 
urged the ICC to initiate an investigation into the situation in Georgia. 
For example, on April 24, 2012, a network of Georgian and 
international NGOs submitted an open letter to the Prosecutor urging 
her to open an investigation into the crimes allegedly committed during 
the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.54 Subsequently, following the 
Prosecutor’s request to the PTC for authorization of an investigation, 
five Georgian civil society organizations submitted a written statement 
urging the PTC judges to authorize the Prosecutor’s request.55 
Additionally, with a view to further assisting victims and facilitating the 
ICC process, following the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of 
an investigation into the situation in Georgia, Georgian civil society 
organizations visited numerous conflict-affected villages such as 
Ergneti and Nikozi, assisting victims of the alleged crimes to submit 
representations to the PTC highlighting their views and expectations.56 
When the ICC investigation finally came to fruition, its initiation was 
celebrated by members of Georgian civil society. As the chair of the 
Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Ana Natsvlishvili, stated in a 
media release, “[years] after . . . the August 2008 war, perpetrators 
continue to live with impunity while victims of grave human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations are left without any redress, 
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the long-awaited opening of an ICC investigation and prospects for 
justice is welcome”.57 
Georgian civil society hoped that the ICC would investigate a 
range of alleged crimes committed both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
leading to future prosecutions at the Court.58 In order to remain 
engaged with the process and keep interest alive, in July 2019, eleven 
years after the conclusion of the armed conflict, the Georgian civil 
society organizations comprising the Georgian Coalition for 
International Criminal Court (GCICC)59 launched a report titled ‘10 
Years after the August War: Victims of the Situation in Georgia’.60 The 
report includes an analysis of the ICC’s activities and involvement 
since the opening of its investigation into the situation in Georgia and 
the findings of in-depth sociological research conducted in 2018.61 It 
is based on research covering the majority of victims’ settlements 
dotted throughout Georgia, encompassing over 2,400 families.62 The 
report makes constructive recommendations both for Georgian 
government authorities as well as for the different organs of the ICC, 
including the OTP, Registry, Trust Fund for Victims, and the ICC’s 
country office in Georgia.63 The report was compiled as an avenue 
through which to inform the public and the international community 
about the Georgian situation vis-à-vis the ICC, shed light on the plight 
of victims, and focus the world’s attention on the situation in 
Georgia.64 Additionally, Georgian civil society organizations have been 
active participants at international fora including at ICC NGO 
roundtable meetings, ICC Assembly of States Parties sessions, and ICC 
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side events, where they have been highlighting the need for 
accountability and increased ICC action, and areas for improvement.65 
B. Advocating for informed and timely ICC action: bridging the 
communication gap between the ICC and the public 
During the ICC’s preliminary examination stage, the OTP 
received the cooperation of both Georgian and Russian authorities, 
who strove to advance their own individual accountability narratives. 
During this stage, the OTP was in regular contact with relevant actors 
including civil society and national authorities in Georgia and Russia in 
order to gather relevant information regarding the alleged crimes, to 
ascertain the genuineness of any national prosecutions, and to verify 
information.66 However, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch have 
observed that, compared to high levels of OTP engagement in 
situations such as those in Guinea and Colombian, ICC engagement in 
Georgia has been comparably limited.67 
At the initiation of the ICC investigation, civil society 
organisations stressed the importance of the Court, and especially the 
OTP, adopting a clear and timely court-wide strategy outlining the 
ICC’s engagement in Georgia. Here, the importance of outreach 
activities and clear communication between the Court and relevant 
national actors was stressed as a vital component to be considered. 
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However, from the very outset, concerns were voiced regarding the 
realities the Court may face when conducting its investigation. As 
Elizabeth Evenson, senior international justice counsel at Human 
Rights Watch has stated, “[t]he Georgia investigation is a reminder that 
the ICC is dealing with more and different kinds of cases than 
envisioned at its creation in 1998” and “the court and its member 
countries should face [the] reality about what the ICC will need in 
resources, in cooperation, and in political support to deliver on its 
mandate in this changed landscape.”68 During the first year following 
the initiation of the ICC investigation into the situation in Georgia, the 
Court was repeatedly criticized for its limited engagement with victims 
and civil society on the ground. Perhaps most startlingly, during a joint 
visit undertaken by Georgian and international NGOs to the 
Tserovani IDP settlement in December 2016, it was discovered that 
most victims had never heard of the ICC or that it had initiated an 
investigation in 2015 into the war that rendered them IDPs.69 
Moreover, being the first situation investigated outside of the 
African continent, certain civil society actors expressed the sentiment 
that the Court was unfamiliar with the region in which they were 
operating.70 Additionally, having previously had limited reasons for 
interacting with the Court, Georgians were also unfamiliar with the 
ICC as a judicial institution.71 Differentiating the ICC from other 
judicial institutions based in The Hague, such as the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), and understanding the ICC’s mandate and the 
parameter’s within which the Court must operate, is undoubtedly a 
difficult task for non-experts. Inter-state proceedings linked to the 
same conflict have been initiated at the ICJ. However, many fail to 
distinguish between the two institutions. Even Georgian government 
officials and politicians have been criticised for conflating the ICC 
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investigation with proceedings initiated at the ICJ.72 Confusion also 
seems to reign amongst victims regarding the difference between the 
ICC and the ECtHR. Given this background, civil society 
organizations have been particularly critical of the ICC for not 
conducting outreach activities in order to differentiate between the 
various parallel proceedings and especially to outline the differences 
between itself and the ICJ, which has led Georgians to believe that the 
ICC has been investigating an inter-state claim filed by Georgia against 
Russia.73 
Given this stark gap in information and the Court’s limited 
engagement with victim populations, civil society has played a key role 
in building bridges between the ICC and those affected by the 2008 
Russia-Georgia war. NGOs such as the Human Rights Center, in 
partnership with other civil society organizations working under the 
framework of the GCICC, have visited IDP settlements and provided 
information to victims about the ICC process.74 However, victims 
appear to be losing hope, believing that the ICC process will fail to 
yield any tangible results.75 The time it has taken for the ICC to conduct 
its preliminary examination, and now its investigation, is seen as a 
hindrance, as is the bureaucracy surrounding the situation.76 
In more positive news, the ICC’s, and especially the OTP’s, 
engagement efforts in Georgia have improved since the first year of 
initiating its investigation. A team of investigators has been established 
and several other activities have been initiated. The ICC and its organs, 
including the OTP, Public Information and Outreach Section, the 
Victims Participation and Reparations Section, and the Trust Fund for 
Victims, appear to have stepped up their activities in Georgia. 
Throughout 2019, representatives of the Court visited the country 
meeting with local civil society, providing interviews to journalists, 
arranging information sessions for affected communities and 
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conducting training sessions for local lawyers on victims’ 
participation.77 
In terms of the ongoing investigation, the head of the ICC’s 
Georgian country office has stressed that it is progressing at full speed 
and that OTP staff are constantly being deployed to the field in 
furtherance of the investigation.78 However, the confidential nature 
surrounding the OTP’s investigative activities, while vital and an 
essential element of the investigation process, has inadvertently meant 
that the public has gained limited insight regarding the Court’s 
investigative efforts and their progress. Given this, civil society 
activists have repeatedly called upon the Court to conduct vigorous 
outreach and public information activities.79 In response, the OTP has 
repeatedly reiterated the extreme level of confidentiality that is crucial 
for the preservation of the integrity of the investigation.80 While 
statements have been made by ICC officials outlining that the ongoing 
investigative activities are independent of public outreach and 
engagement activities,81 this aspect needs to be communicated broadly 
in order to instil trust in the Court’s activities and lessen the chances 
for the spread of misinformation regarding the Court. This is especially 
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vital given that the Court has repeatedly been criticised for its lengthy 
investigation and lack of transparency.82 
Georgian civil society has called for a more balanced approach 
in terms of informing victims and the Georgian public of the Court’s 
activities. Pointing especially to the need for managing the expectations 
of victims, civil society members have stressed that being informed of 
the progress of the investigation, at least to the extent of the non-
confidential aspects that would not jeopardize the investigation, would 
assist in ensuring the cooperation of victims and prepare the public for 
possible future events.83 Moreover, civil society actors have pointed to 
the need for the Court to outline the obstacles it faces and may face 
during the conduction of its investigation and during any future 
prosecutorial processes.84 Georgian civil society actors have especially 
stressed the importance of informing victims and the Georgian public 
about several issues that the ICC might encounter during its 
investigation.85 These issues may include: The lack of Russian 
cooperation; not being able to gain access to Russian or pro-Russian 
held territories in order to collect evidence; and should the 
investigation lead to the issuing of arrest warrants, the reduced 
prospects of securing the arrest of alleged Russian accused and the 
possibility that only Georgian accused may be subject to prosecution. 
Especially given statements by senior political figures, such as the 
former Georgian minister of defense, that no proof exists of any 
international crimes having been committed by Georgians,86 in order 
to minimize the chances of any future backlash by the Georgian public, 
it is vital that the ICC clearly communicate that it may investigate all 
parties to the conflict, including Georgians. 
C. Advocating the establishment of an ICC country office in 
Georgia 
The December 2017 opening of the ICC country office in 
Tbilisi, Georgia was widely heralded as a step in the right direction. 
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Civil society activists have viewed the establishment of the Office as 
being a direct result of persistent calls by NGOs for such an initiative.87 
It was an ICC first in that it was the first ICC country office to be 
opened outside the African continent. In a surprising move, however, 
the appointed head of the country office was a foreign diplomat who 
spoke neither Georgian nor Ossetian, whose appointment was met 
with scepticism given his perceived unfamiliarity with the ICC and its 
processes.88 When advocating for the opening of a new country office, 
the hope of Georgian civil society was that it would result in a boost 
in the outreach activities conducted by the Court in Georgia.89 The 
head of the country office, Dr. Kaupo Kand, has emphasized the 
importance of carrying out outreach activities and engaging with 
various actors linked to the situation including victims, the general 
public, state institutions, academia, the diplomatic community, and 
international organizations.90 However, the country office has been 
criticised for several failings. This criticism has revolved around 
insufficient staffing, lack of knowledge of the national context, the 
language barrier hindering communicating directly with affected 
communities, geographical remoteness from affected communities, 
and organizing local outreach events whilst failing to include civil 
society representatives.91 Some civil society actors have viewed these 
factors as severely curtailing the effectiveness of the country office’s 
operations and have persistently called upon the country office to pay 
heed to these concerns.92 
D. Combatting misinformation and false news 
In the Georgian context, combatting misinformation and false 
news regarding the ICC and its actions is another significant task that 
has been undertaken by civil society. In Georgia, the information 
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vacuum created due to the limited outreach activities conducted by the 
ICC has given rise to conspiracy theories regarding the Court’s actions. 
For instance, during the 2018 Georgian presidential elections, this 
information vacuum created a political climate where the ICC 
investigation was elevated to the level of a campaign issue. Rumours 
circulated that the ICC investigation could be used as a means to target 
Georgian military personnel on politically motivated grounds.93 These 
claims of bias had the potential to create great reputational losses for 
the Court. Recognizing the immensely volatile domestic political 
situation, Georgian civil society actors issued statements to the press 
and took to social media in order to defuse these claims and to 
emphasize the Court’s neutrality in investigating crimes committed by 
all parties to the armed conflict.94 Regardless of this, claims of bias have 
lingered and combatting this misinformation and countering fake news 
is a constant task. Recently, the ICC has been blamed for conducting 
a one-sided investigation targeting former Georgian state officials.95 In 
December 2019, Facebook announced that it has removed a number 
of accounts and pages from two of its platforms, Facebook and 
Instagram, originating from Georgia and targeting domestic audiences, 
“for engaging in foreign and government interference”, which 
consisted of “coordinated inauthentic behaviour on behalf of a 
government or foreign actor”.96 According to digital forensic 
researchers based in Georgia, some of the removed pages fueled 
confusion and division on one of the topics considered most sensitive 
for Georgians: the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.97 Georgian civil 
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society organizations claim that fake reports and misleading 
information regarding the conflict and the ICC investigation into the 
situation are widespread across Georgian society.98 Within the 
Georgian context, these situations elucidate the vital role played by 
civil society in bridging the gap between the ICC and public by 
stepping in to provide vital information about the Court’s operations 
in order to assuage fears and doubts regarding the Court’s processes. 
It further highlights the grave need for added dissemination of 
information regarding the ICC and its operational parameters to the 
public in international crime affected states such as Georgia. While 
Georgian civil society organizations do acknowledge that they are 
attempting to fill the information gap, they simultaneously admit that 
they cannot replace the Court’s outreach functions.99 Thus, they have 
been advocating for an approach where the ICC Prosecutor publicly 
responds to allegations of bias in order to ensure public trust and 
support.100 However, combating misinformation regarding the ICC 
and facts surrounding the Russia-Georgia war on a broader scale, 
requires a more holistic approach involving joint action by the Court, 
the Georgian government and civil society. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the EU fact-finding report on the 2008 Russia-
Georgia war, “there are no winners in [the] conflict. Everyone has lost, 
if not in terms of life and property alone, at least in the field of hopes 
and prospects for the future”.101 In Georgia, while the armed conflict 
may have come to an end, the country failed to resolve the political 
issues and other contributory factors that led to the war. Tensions are 
high and the political situation appears to have been exacerbated. 
26,888 individuals were said to have been forced to abandon their 
homes due to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, many of whom have been 
resettled in various municipalities of Georgia.102 However, rampant 
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issues linger. For these and other victims of the conflict, aspirations 
for achieving justice remain in a state of limbo. 
Simultaneously, for some, interest in striving for justice 
appears to be waning. As Human Rights Watch noted in 2018, in terms 
of domestic and international accountability mechanisms, including 
the ongoing ICC investigation, the demand for accountability for the 
alleged crimes committed during the 2008 conflict is weak in 
Georgia.103 Moreover, due to the lack of awareness in the country 
about the ICC and its activities, victims’ support groups are 
increasingly becoming more invested in submitting applications to the 
ECtHR. This was despite the ECtHR’s delay in dealing with individual 
applications arising out of the Russia-Georgia war until the inter-state 
claim in Georgia v. Russia (II) (application no. 38263/08)104 was 
finalized.105 An explanation for this lean towards the ECtHR could lie 
in the perceived inexperience of the ICC in dealing with situations 
concerning Russia. Given that the Georgian and Ukrainian106 
situations are the first instances where the ICC has initiated preliminary 
examination and investigative activities with a link to Russia, the 
ECtHR is perceived by some Georgians as being the preferred avenue 
for justice due to a better track record of holding Russia accountable.107 
Additionally, some civil society actors opine that for the ICC’s OTP, 
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engagement with civil society is not a priority.108 Due to this perception 
and due to the lack of information flowing from the OTP to civil 
society, NGO interest in the ICC has faded to some extent. This is 
unfortunate for the ICC given that Georgian NGOs have carried out 
a bridge building function between the Court and affected populations 
since the end of the war. Hence, this development means that the 
Court risks losing important allies. Moreover, this development is 
particularly unfortunate given that the ICC offers victims of the 2008 
Russia-Georgia war an extra avenue through which to seek justice (in 
addition to institutions such as the ECtHR). 
Should the ICC investigation result in prosecutions of those 
holding the highest level of responsibility for the alleged commission 
of international crimes arising from the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, it 
would send a clear message that impunity does not reign supreme. 
Such future ICC prosecutions (should they materialize) may offer the 
promise of acting as a galvanizing force for the re-initiation of 
domestic investigative and prosecutorial measures for any alleged 
international crimes committed by low level perpetrators in Georgia. 
However, from a realistic point of view, the Georgian authorities’ past 
track record indicates that the chances of mounting the political will to 
initiate such action may be slim. 
As outlined in the previous sections of this article, civil society 
organizations have continuously advocated for justice for those 
affected by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, both at the national and 
international levels. However, despite an active and vocal civil society 
presence in Georgia, these organizations have faced countless 
obstacles. Especially at the national level, it is reported that during the 
previous government, civil society organizations could only exercise 
limited pressure for justice.109 The former Georgian government 
dismissed calls for accountability by using nationalistic rhetoric, 
questioning NGO allegiances, demonizing the NGO sector, and 
calling those who dared to point out alleged crimes by Georgian 
servicemen “traitors.”110 
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As civil society actors have pointed out, the Georgian situation 
is “unique” in that it poses new challenges for the ICC related to “a 
lack of knowledge of the new region, inexperience of dealing with 
international conflict, and non-cooperation of a very powerful country 
involved in the conflict.”111 Civil society too has much to learn from 
others who have previously interacted with the ICC. Given its unique 
role in often acting as the link between the Court and victims, 
supporting civil society and building good working relationships is vital 
for the ICC. According to some civil society activists, for the ICC, 
maintaining positive working relationships with civil society “will go a 
long way in making [its] investigation in Georgia meaningful to those 
most in need”.112 Should the Court adopt a strategy of limited 
engagement with Georgian civil society, as discussed previously in this 
article, this could generate an information vacuum. Uninformed or 
misinformed victim populations are less likely to cooperate with the 
ICC in its potential future prosecutorial processes. While the Court 
should amp up its public outreach activities in Georgia, one should be 
realistic in terms of the reach and form of these activities. Resources 
and other constraints mean that the Court’s outreach activities on the 
ground in Georgia cannot be exhaustive. Therefore, through 
simultaneously developing good working relationships with civil 
society who have already forged close ties with victim populations, the 
Court could harness and utilize the communication avenues of some 
of their biggest allies in Georgia. This, in turn, could have the potential 
to boost the confidence the victim population has in the Court and 
highlight the ICC’s image as a judicial institution that is truly invested 
in the plight of victims striving to deliver justice to international crime 
affected populations. 
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